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Centripetal Forces: Multidistrict Litigation and Its
Parts
Catherine R. Borden, Emery G. Lee III, and Margaret S. Williams*
INTRODUCTION
Almost by definition, multidistrict litigation is complex. One
consequence of this complexity is that multidistrict litigation may
be viewed from a variety of perspectives. First, multidistrict
litigation may be viewed from the perspective of its share of
overall civil litigation in the federal courts. Commentators
sometimes stress that a relatively large percentage of all civil
litigation takes place within multidistrict aggregations,1 a point that
is also sometimes made in official court reports.2 Multidistrict
litigation may also be viewed at the level of centralized
proceedings and thus understood at the level of what one might term
“individual aggregations.” Such a perspective lends itself to a
discussion of global settlements and the practical and ethical issues
involved in negotiating and reviewing such.3 Relatedly, multidistrict
Copyright 2014, by CATHERINE R. BORDEN, EMERY G. LEE III, AND
MARGARET S. WILLIAMS.
* The authors are researchers at the Federal Judicial Center. Affiliation is
provided for identification only. The views expressed in this Article are those of
the authors and not those of the Federal Judicial Center or any other judicialbranch entity. This work has benefited from the comments of our FJC
colleagues, including Joe Cecil and Dan Holt, as well as the comments of
participants in the Symposium, especially Francis McGovern.
1. See, e.g., John G. Heyburn II & Francis E. McGovern, Evaluating and
Improving the MDL Process, 38 LITIGATION 26, 26 (2012) (estimating that
MDL cases account for more than 15% of all civil litigation in the federal
courts); Eldon E. Fallon, Common Benefit Fees in Multidistrict Litigation, 74
LA. L. REV. 371, 373 (2014) (same).
2. Fluctuations in the number of new MDL cases are often evident in the
courts’ overall statistics. In 2012, for example, the courts reported that civil
filings based on diversity of citizenship declined by 15%, “primarily because of
a 60 percent decline in filings of multidistrict litigation (MDL) cases related to
asbestos (down by 22,561 cases).” See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS,
JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2012, “U.S. DISTRICT COURTS,” available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2012/us-district-courts.aspx,
archived at http://perma .cc/7CCM-TYBB (last visited Sept. 17, 2012).
3. See, e.g., Elizabeth Chamblee [Burch], Unsettling Efficiency: When
Non-Class Aggregation of Mass Torts Creates Second-Class Settlements, 65 LA.
L. REV. 157, 195–96 (2004) [hereinafter Burch, Unsettling Efficiency] (“[T]he
practical consequence of transfer translates into a non-opt out class action for
pretrial purposes and produces settlement as would class certification. . . .
Consequently, efficiency through procedural devices, without the balance of
fairness, does not necessarily correlate into just outcomes.”).
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litigation may be viewed from the perspective of the “repeat
player” attorneys who often play a decisive role in the shape and
ultimate outcome of proceedings.4
A less common frame, perhaps, is that of the constituent civil
actions which together comprise the proceedings proposed for
centralization. From the perspective of a centralized proceeding or
of a repeat player with a large inventory of claims, these
constituent civil actions—referred to as “MDL cases”—may seem
relatively unimportant. Unless an MDL case is selected as a
potential bellwether trial case,5 for example, little individualized
discovery or activity may actually take place. And yet, the sheer
volume of MDL cases suggests that scholars and policymakers
should not focus exclusively on the other levels of analysis. There
is certainly room for increasing our understanding of these
essential parts of MDL proceedings.
Scholars and policymakers have a reasonably adequate
understanding of what happens to cases resolved by a transferee
court in a centralized MDL proceeding. But there are two
categories of MDL cases that are not resolved in an MDL
transferee court: cases that are part of a motion to transfer before
the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation that is not granted,
and the section 1407 remand cases, which are centralized but then
remanded to the transferor court at the conclusion of common
pretrial matters in the aggregate proceeding. In the terms used by
the organizers of this Symposium, these cases are decidedly
disaggregated. With respect to the first category, the MDL cases
are aggregated in a motion and, possibly, in the Panel’s
deliberations but then not formally aggregated. With respect to the
second category, the MDL cases are formally aggregated in the
centralized proceeding but then broken back into separate civil
actions. It is safe to say that much less is known, in general, about
these two groups of cases at the margins of the MDL process.
4. See generally Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Procedural Justice in
Nonclass Aggregation, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1 (2009) (discussing role and
incentives of repeat players); Margaret S. Williams et al., Repeat Players in
Federal Multidistrict Litigation, 5 J. TORT L. 141 (2012) (using social network
analysis to identify and map the network of repeat plaintiff attorneys in MDL
proceedings); Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Judging Multidistrict Litigation, 90
N.Y.U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015) (mapping repeat players’ appointments to
leadership positions in centralized proceedings).
5. A bellwether trial (sometimes called a “test” trial) is a trial of a
representative case in an MDL proceeding intended “to provide meaningful
information and experience to everyone involved in the litigation.” Eldon E.
Fallon et al., Bellwether Trials in Multidistrict Litigation, 82 TUL. L. REV. 2323,
2332 (2008).
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Using a variety of data sources, this Article systematically
examines the universe of MDL cases—centralized and noncentralized—with a special emphasis on these two groups of
disaggregated cases. Part I provides a brief overview of the MDL
process. Part II then provides a systematic analysis of the
centralization of MDL cases, with a special focus in Part III on
cases that are non-centralized. Somewhat surprisingly, many noncentralized cases do eventually end up transferred to another
district, either to another MDL proceeding or to another federal
venue under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). Part IV provides an analysis of
the termination of centralized MDL cases—most of which
terminate in the transferee court—and Part V documents what
happens to section 1407 remand cases when they return to the
transferor court. We find that few section 1407 remand cases are
actually tried post-remand; most settle.
I. THE MDL PROCESS
In this Article, the term “MDL cases” is used to describe all
cases that come before the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict
Litigation (the Panel), regardless of whether they are ever
transferred and made part of an MDL proceeding. MDL cases are
handled by the Panel under the authority granted by the
Multidistrict Litigation Act of 1968.6 The Panel may centralize
“civil actions involving one or more common questions of fact”
before a single district judge “for coordinated or consolidated
pretrial proceedings” when doing so will promote “the
convenience of parties and witnesses and will promote the just and
efficient conduct of such actions.”7
The first cases that become MDL cases are those subject to a
motion to transfer,8 in which a party requests that a group of cases
be centralized before a single district judge, called the transferee
judge. If the Panel grants the motion, it issues a Transfer Order.
Centralized MDL cases—including non-transferred cases already
in the transferee district—become part of an MDL proceeding in
the transferee court. If the Panel denies centralization by issuing an
Order Denying Transfer, the cases remain in the district courts in

6. See 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2012).
7. Id. § 1407(a).
8. In the early days of the Panel, show-cause orders played a major role,
but they are no longer very common. See Rules of Procedure of the Judicial
Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, Rule 8.1, 277 F.R.D. 480 (2011) [hereinafter
Panel Rules].
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which they were initially filed or removed to. Non-centralized
cases are discussed in detail below.9
The centralization decision does not end the Panel’s work.
Cases continue to come before the Panel as potential tag-alongs.
Tag-along cases involve common questions of fact with already
centralized cases or cases subject to a pending centralization
motion.10 Potential tag-alongs in other districts are usually brought
to the Panel’s attention by attorneys in centralized proceedings or
by parties in the potential tag-alongs. If the common questions of
fact are apparent, the Panel’s clerk issues a Conditional Transfer
Order (CTO). The CTO becomes final, and the cases are
transferred, after seven days if no party objects.11 When tag-along
status is disputed, the Panel will issue an order granting or denying
transfer. Some tag-along cases are already before the Panel while it
is considering centralization. Between the filing of the motion and
the Panel’s centralization decision, a number of potential tag-along
cases may already have been added to the docket. The Panel is
aware of the cases and may refer to them in its centralization
decision—the number of potential tag-alongs can inform the
Panel’s decision for or against centralization.12 But these early
potential tag-alongs are not typically governed by the order
granting or denying centralization. If centralization is granted,
these cases will typically be included in the first CTO.
The Panel plays no role in adjudicating the merits of MDL
cases, regardless of whether the cases are centralized.13 The
9. See infra at notes 29–75 and accompanying text.
10. It should be noted that, in this paper, we define tag-alongs slightly
differently than the Panel does. “‘Tag-along action’ refers to a civil action
pending in a district court which involves common questions of fact with either
(1) actions on a pending motion to transfer to create an MDL or (2) actions
previously transferred to an existing MDL, and which the Panel would consider
transferring under Section 1407.” Panel Rules, supra note 8, at Rule 1.1(h).
Because “[p]otential tag-along actions filed in the transferee district do not
require Panel action,” they are not technically considered tag-alongs and are
consolidated or coordinated using the transferee court’s procedures for intradistrict reassignment of cases. Id. at Rule 7.2(a). In this Article, we use the term
“tag-along” to mean all cases centralized after the original transfer motion is
decided, whether or not they originate in the transferee district.
11. See id. at Rule 7.1(b), (c).
12. See, e.g., In re Gen. Motors Corp. Dex-Cool Prods. Liab. Litig., 293 F.
Supp. 2d 1381 (J.P.M.L. 2003) (ordering transfer of a single action to join one
other action pending in district where eight tag-along actions expected).
13. In the words of a former Panel chairman:
Bear in mind that we don’t become involved, at all, in the merits of the
claims or disputes in multidistrict litigation. We really are gatekeepers,
deciding whether certain litigation should be let through the gates, so to
speak, and, if so, where it should go. After that, it’s entirely within the
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transferee court has the same authority with respect to pretrial
proceedings as it would in any other case.14 Centralized cases are
either disposed of in the transferee court (by termination of the
case, remand to state court, transfer to another district, etc.), or
remanded to their transferor courts. The Panel retains the authority
to remand centralized cases back to their transferor courts. The
MDL Act requires remand “at or before the conclusion of such
pretrial proceedings to the district from which it was transferred
unless it shall have been previously terminated.”15
Although remand is required if all pretrial matters are
concluded, the transferee court need not wait until that point.
Centralization is intended to “promote the just and efficient
conduct”16 of the centralized cases, not to ensure that no pretrial
matters remain for the transferor court. In determining when to
suggest remand, the guiding principle is whether common issues
have been resolved and only individual issues remain. As a guide
for judges states, “[r]emand is not appropriate if there is more to be
done on the cases as a group. But remand may be appropriate if the
remaining proceedings relate to individual cases and issues rather
than to the entire docket or to groups of cases.”17 The transferee
court or any party may file a suggestion of remand before the
Panel.18 In practice, the Panel generally remands cases only when
the transferee court has filed a suggestion of remand.19 Later

prerogative of the transferee judge to manage the litigation and make
all procedural and substantive rulings the case might require in a
pretrial context.
Chair of Judicial Panel Sees Role as Gatekeeper, THE THIRD BRANCH (Admin.
Office of the U.S. Courts, Wash., D.C.), Nov. 2005, at 2.
14. “During the pendency of the MDL, [the transferee judge] may exercise all
the powers available to a federal judge in any other case.” BARBARA J. ROTHSTEIN
& CATHERINE R. BORDEN, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., MANAGING MULTIDISTRICT
LITIGATION IN PRODUCTS LIABILITY CASES: A POCKET GUIDE FOR TRANSFEREE
JUDGES 3 (2011), available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/MDLG
dePL.pdf/$file/MDLGdePL.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/44GC-AV4V.
15. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (2012). The Supreme Court has ruled that a
transferee court may not transfer cases to itself under 28 U.S.C. § 1404 for
purposes of conducting a trial after pretrial matters have been resolved. See
Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26, 27
(1998).
16. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (2012).
17. ROTHSTEIN & BORDEN, supra note 14, at 48.
18. Panel Rules, supra note 8, at Rule 10.1(b).
19. “Consideration of remand may be initiated by any of three means:
motion of any party, suggestion of the transferee court, or on the Panel’s own
initiative. Of these, suggestion of remand by the transferee court is both the most
common and the most likely to result in remand being ordered.” DAVID HERR,
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sections explore the commonality of remand, but first we turn to
aggregate litigation to provide a comparison.
II. MDL CASES CENTRALIZED AND NON-CENTRALIZED
Simply put, there are a lot of MDL cases. The Panel Cases
Database contains information on 463,795 cases that have appeared on
the Panel’s docket.20 Products liability cases heavily dominate this
database, accounting for 93% of the cases. Securities is the next largest
case category, making up just 1.4% of the database. Only 20% of all
MDL proceedings involve products liability claims, but the
overwhelming majority of cases that are considered by the Panel
involve such claims. The Panel Cases Database is, in fact, dominated
by a few mammoth products liability proceedings. The largest, not
surprisingly, is MDL No. 875, In re Asbestos Products Liability
Litigation (No. VI), which accounts for 200,265 cases, or 43% of the
database. MDL No. 875 and the ten next largest products liability
proceedings account for 71% of the database.21 All the non-products

MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION MANUAL § 10:6 (2014) (footnote omitted). See also
Panel Rules, supra note 8, at Rule 10.1(b) (“Typically, the transferee judge
recommends remand of an action, or a part of it, to the transferor court at any
time by filing a suggestion of remand with the Panel.”)
20. The Panel Cases Database was created for this project using MDL case
records collected by the JPML clerk’s office. These data are used by the JPML,
for example, in compiling its annual reports. See, e.g., Judicial Panel on
Multidistrict Litig., Calendar Year Statistics of the United States Judicial Panel
on Multidistrict Litigation, January through December 2013, available at
http://www.jpml.uscourts.gov/sites/jpml/files/JPML_Calendar_Year_Statistics2013.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/89DN-2YP6. The records appear to be
complete for cases docketed after the Panel’s automation in 1992; prior to 1992,
the records are limited to a few specific proceedings, including MDL 875
(initiated in 1991). Less than 1% of the cases have a disposition date prior to
1991. Inclusion of that small number of cases is unlikely to affect our findings.
For more information on the data used, see infra Technical Appendix.
21. These proceedings are, in order of size: In re Silicone Gel Breast
Implants Prods. Liab. Litig., 793 F. Supp. 1098 (J.P.M.L. 1992); In re Diet
Drugs (Phentermine/Fenfluramine/Dexfenfluramine) Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL
No. 1203, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 121169 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 15, 2010); In re
Welding Fume Prods. Liab. Litig., 364 F. Supp. 2d 669 (N.D. Ohio 2005); In re
Yasmin and Yaz (Drospirenone) Mktg., Sales Practices and Prods. Liab. Litig.,
MDL No. 2100, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95475 (S.D. Ill. Aug. 25, 2011); In re
Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 1657, 2007 WL 2406850 (E.D. La. Aug.
20, 2007); In re Prempro Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 1507, 2010 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 50748 (J.P.M.L. May 17, 2010); In re Am. Med. Sys., Inc., Pelvic
Repair Sys. Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 2325, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71479
(J.P.M.L. May 22, 2012); In re Ethicon, Inc., Pelvic Repair Sys. Prods. Liab.
Litig., MDL No. 2327, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 179053 (S.D. W. Va. Dec. 20,
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liability cases account for just 7%. There are almost as many cases in
MDL No. 926 (In re Silicone Gel Breast Implant Products Liability
Litigation) in the database as there are cases from all other non-product
liability types of proceedings (air disaster, antitrust, and so on)
combined.
How does the Panel dispose of the individual cases on its docket?
How many of those cases actually become part of a centralized MDL
proceeding through transfer or related means? A case becomes part of
a centralized MDL proceeding—identified in this Article as a
“centralized MDL case” whether or not transferred—when it is
disposed of in one of four ways by the Panel. These are identified in
the database by the following codes: Transfer; CTO Final; NTN; and
TR’E Severed.
(1) Transfer. A case may be transferred to a transferee court by a
Transfer Order. A Transfer Order is typically the centralization
decision, but a decision on a disputed potential tag-along may also be
termed a Transfer Order.
(2) CTO Final. A case may be transferred to a transferee court
subsequent to a Transfer Order in a Conditional Transfer Order. The
CTO is “conditional” for seven days; at the expiration of that time,
absent any objection, the CTO is made final and the case is transferred
to a proceeding. These are tag-along cases, discussed above.22
(3) NTN. A case may be made part of an MDL proceeding in the
district in which it was originally filed, and thus without transfer.
These cases are called “NTN” cases in Panel argot—i.e., “No Transfer
Necessary” cases. NTN cases are considered “centralized” for
purposes of this Article. They may be either cases included in an
original motion to transfer or cases filed later in the transferee district.
(4) TR’E Severed. Cases may be created within an existing MDL
proceeding through a procedure known as “Transferee Severed.” This
procedure splits an already centralized case into separate actions; in a
sense, it is “reverse joinder,” in that multiple parties joined in a single
case are severed into multiple cases for purposes of the proceeding.23

2013); In re Baycol Prods. Liab. Litig., 218 F.R.D. 197 (D. Minn. 2003); In re
Seroquel Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 1769, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124798
(M.D. Fla. Jan. 30, 2009).
22. See supra notes 10–12 and accompanying text.
23. This procedure has only been used since 2004, and the nearly 100,000
cases are found in only 20 proceedings. These are obviously large proceedings, for
the most part, including Asbestos, Diet Drugs, Prempro, Welding Fumes, Vioxx,
and Seroquel proceedings as well as the following: In re Phenylpropanolamine
(PPA) Products Liability Litigation, 69 Pa. D. & C.4th 320 (Pa. C. P. 2003); In re
Silica Products Liability Litigation, 398 F. Supp. 2d 563 (S.D. Tex. 2005); In re
Ortho Evra Products Liability Litigation, 422 F. Supp. 2d 1379 (J.P.M.L. 2006);
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Together, these four disposition codes, representing different
avenues of centralization, account for 96% of the cases before the
Panel. In other words, a relatively small number of cases on the
Panel’s docket are not centralized—and many, if not most, of those are
not centralized because the case terminated in the potential transferor
district court prior to final action by the Panel.24 The denial of a
motion to transfer accounts for just 0.7% of all case dispositions in the
Panel Cases Database.
The most common disposition was CTO Final, which accounts for
180,904 cases, or 42% of all case dispositions. In short, tag-along
cases are a common feature of multidistrict litigation. NTN cases
represent the next largest category of dispositions, with 104,752
cases—25% of all dispositions. Next are the transferee-severed cases,
which account for 99,799 cases (23%), and then the transfers, which
amount to 22,433 cases (5%). A large number of MDL cases, nearly
half, are centralized but not transferred because they were originally
filed in the transferee court (NTN cases) or have been created as new
cases in the transferee court (Transferee Severed cases).
One additional point should be made with respect to NTN cases.
In some MDL proceedings, the parties agree to—and the judge issues
an order allowing—direct filing. In direct filing, new plaintiffs may
file actions in the transferee district, even if venue is not proper.25
Provision may be made for eventual transfer under 28 U.S.C. §

In re Aredia & Zometa Products Liability Litigation, MDL No. 1760, 2008 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 43433 (M.D. Tenn. May 13, 2008).
24. Why are we confident enough to state that most of these cases terminate
in the potential transferor court prior to a Panel disposition? Of the Panel
dispositions that do not result in a case becoming part of an MDL proceeding—
about 4% of all dispositions—the most common code is “No Action Taken,”
which accounts for 2% of all dispositions (or half of all dispositions in cases that
do not become part of an MDL proceeding). These cases are likely terminated in
the potential transferor court prior to Panel action—thus no action is required by
the Panel. Similarly, the CTO may be vacated if the case terminates in the
potential transferor district during the seven-day stay; these dispositions account
for 1.5% of all dispositions. Other codes that appear infrequently in the database
are “SCO Vacated” (i.e., Show Cause Order Vacated), “Motion Moot,” and
“Motion Withdrawn.” The denial of the motion to transfer a proceeding
accounts for just 0.7% of all case dispositions.
25. See, e.g., Court Management Order, In re Actos (Pioglitazone) Products
Liab. Litig., No. 6:11-md-2299 (W.D. La. Apr. 9, 2012) available at http://www
.lawd.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/UPLOADS/11-md-2299.2012APR09.pdf,
archived at http://perma.cc/CY28-MDEM?type=pdf; Case Management Order
No. 7, In re Tylenol (Acetaminophen) Mktg., Sales Practices and Prods. Liab.
Litig., No. 2:13-md-2436 (June 17, 2013) available at https://www.paed
.uscourts.gov/documents/MDL/MDL2436/CMO7.pdf, archived at http://perma
.cc/CCX9-8XQ3?type=pdf.
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1404(a) to an identified district for trial.26 When direct filing is
permitted, a large number of NTNs may not indicate that the
controversy is largely local.
The disposition codes for asbestos, non-asbestos products liability,
and all other cases are summarized in Figure 1. For asbestos cases (the
first column, representing 166,697 total cases), CTO Final (46%) is the
most common disposition, and Transferee Severed (41%) is the
second most common. Transferee Severed cases are much more
common in the asbestos MDL proceeding than in either non-asbestos
products liability or in non-products liability—in the latter category,
the procedure has been used in just two cases (rounds to 0% in the
figure). In the asbestos cases, NTN and Transfer dispositions account
for 6% and 4% of asbestos cases, respectively. Together, these four
dispositions comprise 97% of all asbestos case dispositions for the
period 1992–2013.27 Non-centralized cases account for just 3% of
asbestos products liability Panel dispositions.
FIGURE 1: PANEL CASE DISPOSITIONS, 1992–2013

100%
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CTO Final

TR'E Severed

Non-centralized
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40%
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20
0
33

29
18
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For non-asbestos products liability cases (second column,
227,919 cases), the most common disposition code, again, was
26. See ROTHSTEIN & BORDEN, supra note 14, at 30.
27. This analysis excludes the large number of asbestos cases transferred in
the initial order in 1991; if those cases were included, transfer becomes a much
more common disposition for asbestos cases. We have excluded 1991 because
the database is probably not complete for that year. See supra note 20.
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CTO Final—42%. The NTN disposition, 37%, is the second most
common, and is much more common in non-asbestos products
liability cases than in asbestos cases. Together, these codes account
for 79% of the non-asbestos products liability cases. Transferee
Severed cases account for 14% of the non-asbestos products
liability cases, and Transfer accounts for 4%. Altogether, 96% of
the non-asbestos products liability cases included in the analysis
became part of an MDL proceeding, comparable to the figure for
the asbestos cases. Only 4% of the non-asbestos products liability
cases are not centralized.
The non-products liability cases (third column, 32,224 cases)
show a very different pattern than the asbestos and non-asbestos
products liability cases. Most important, a much higher percentage
of non-products liability cases are not centralized—20%, compared
to 3–4% in the other categories. And within the centralization
categories, the disposition codes also differ from the other
columns. The CTO Final rate is much lower for non-products
liability cases, just 29%, and Transfer is a much more common
disposition, accounting for 18% of such cases. There are also a
substantial number, 33%, of NTN cases. These findings indicate
that, in non-products liability cases, there are fewer tag-along cases
(the CTO Final cases), and relatively more cases are centralized in
the initial Transfer Order.
It is worth noting that, for each column in Figure 1, the
Transfer and CTO Final categories amount to approximately 50%.
But there are far more tag-alongs (CTO Final cases) in the
products liability categories, in both percentage and in absolute
numbers.
III. SPOTLIGHT ON NON-CENTRALIZED CASES
In keeping with the Symposium’s theme of disaggregation, this
Article focuses in part on those cases that were potentially part of
an aggregate MDL proceeding but were not centralized. These are
cases that were included in a motion before the Panel but that the
Panel did not centralize.28 In some cases, the Panel did not actually
rule on the motion’s merits, either because the motion was
withdrawn or mooted by a motion case’s resolution in the potential
transferor district. After all, if the motion contains cases from only
two districts, and the case(s) in one district conclude(s), then the
28. This includes a small number of cases that were part of a show-cause
order instead of a motion. For purposes of this section, “motion” includes showcause orders. Moreover, as discussed infra, some of these cases were ultimately
centralized in a separate motion.
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motion loses its multidistrict character and the Panel need not
decide on centralization. For this portion of the paper, cases
brought before the Panel from 2000 through 2013 were examined.
Cases where no action was taken by the Panel, typically because
the case terminated before the Panel could act on it, have been
removed. Of the nearly 3,400 non-centralized cases in the 2000–
2013 database,29 62% were denials, with the remainder almost
evenly divided between withdrawn and mooted motions.

Percentage

FIGURE 2: NON-CENTRALIZED CASES, BY TYPE (N=3,386)
30
25
20
15
10
5
0

26
20
16
8
2

1

4

6

8

9

Figure 2 shows the non-centralized cases, by type, during the
2000–2013 timeframe. Interestingly, products liability cases are
still the most common types of cases (26%), although they are not
as common among the non-centralized cases as they are in the
overall universe of MDL cases—recall that in the Panel Cases
Database, they account for 93% of all cases. This also shows that
some transfer motions involving products liability claims do not
present sufficient common fact issues to merit centralization. More
individualized fact questions may predominate in certain kinds of
cases. One recent—if somewhat gruesome—example of this was
in MDL No. 2079, In re Table Saw Products Liability Litigation.
Forty-two plaintiffs in several districts moved for centralization on
the theory that the table saws shared a common defect, i.e., the
29. See Technical Appendix, infra.
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“lack [of] ‘flesh detection’ technology.”30 The Panel denied the
motion, concluding that any “common issues . . . are overshadowed
by the non-common ones. Each action arises from an individual
accident that occurred under necessarily unique circumstances.”31
The second largest category of non-centralized cases is the
catch-all “miscellaneous” category at 20%.32 Other than securities
(16%), no other category accounts for more than 10% of the noncentralized cases. In short, the non-centralized cases come in all
types, with relatively less common types of litigation (Common
Disaster, Air Disaster) represented by fewer cases.
FIGURE 3: DISPOSITIONS FOR NON-CENTRALIZED AND GENERAL
CIVIL CASES (N=2,978,781), 2000–2013
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30. In re Table Saw Prods. Liab. Litig., 641 F. Supp. 2d 1384, 1384
(J.P.M.L. 2009).
31. Id.
32. Miscellaneous proceedings are those that do not fit within any of the
existing categories (e.g., securities, antitrust, products liability). Examples
include In re McDonald’s Corp. Promotional Games Litigation, 192 F. Supp. 2d
1381 (J.P.M.L. 2002); In re InPhonic, Inc., 460 F. Supp. 2d 1380 (J.P.M.L.
2006); and In re Long-Distance Telephone Service Federal Excise Tax Refund
Litigation, 469 F. Supp. 2d 1348 (J.P.M.L. 2006).
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Figure 3 shows how non-centralized MDL cases (3,366 cases)
terminated in their original district courts, set against general civil
cases (2,978,781 cases) for the same time period—2000 through
2013.33 (The termination of centralized cases is discussed
separately in the next section.) The non-centralized MDL cases,
interestingly, are much more likely to terminate by transfer to
another district, either through a section 1404(a)34 transfer or an
MDL transfer in a different proceeding (section 1407 transfer) than
civil cases in general. Eleven percent of non-centralized MDL
cases are transferred to another district under section 1404(a), as
compared to 4% of civil cases in general. Of course, section
1404(a) transfers are a viable alternative to MDL transfers,
especially in litigation involving a relatively small number of
cases. The Panel has held that “[w]here there are only a limited
number of actions and the involved parties are amenable to Section
1404 transfer, such transfer is generally preferable to centralization
under Section 1407.”35 One potential advantage of section 1404(a)
transfer as opposed to section 1407 transfer is that under the
former, transfer is “not . . . for pretrial purposes only.”36
Similarly, 9% of non-centralized MDL cases are ultimately
made part of another MDL proceeding.37 Overall, 2% of civil cases
terminate in the transferor court by MDL transfer, which is, in
itself, an interesting figure. Although this finding that 9% of cases
in denied motions terminate by MDL transfer initially looks like
some error in the underlying data, there are clearly situations in
which this occurs. In some circumstances, the Panel may consider
both an industry-wide centralization and defendant-specific
33. The analysis in this section is limited to MDL cases filed during or after
2000, and thus is narrower than the preceding discussion of the Panel Cases
Database.
34. See 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2012) (“For the convenience of the parties and
witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action
to any other district or division where it might have been brought . . . .”).
35. In re Gaiam, Inc., Water Bottle Mktg., Sales Practices and Prods. Liab.
Litig., 672 F. Supp. 2d 1373, 1374–75 (J.P.M.L. 2010). See also In re Best Buy
Co., Inc., Cal. Song-Beverly Credit Card Act Litig., 804 F. Supp. 2d 1376, 1378
(J.P.M.L. 2011) (“Seeking transfer under Section 1404(a) or seeking to dismiss
or stay duplicative actions under the first-to-file doctrine are among the variety
of options available to avoid duplication of efforts.”); In re Republic W. Ins. Co.
Ins. Coverage Litig., 206 F. Supp. 2d 1364, 1365 (J.P.M.L. 2002) (“There is a
reasonable prospect that the multidistrict character of the actions here before us
may be eliminated by district court action on motions presently pending . . . for
transfer of venue . . . .”).
36. In re Republic, 206 F. Supp. 2d at 1365.
37. A bit of a technical point: Obviously, our unit of analysis is not “the
case,” but “the case-in-a-motion,” as the same case can be part of more than one
motion to centralize.
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centralizations as options. Consider, for example, MDL No. 1456, In
re Pharmaceutical Industry Average Wholesale Price Litigation,
which was centralized by the Panel in 2002.38 Four defendant
pharmaceutical companies moved for centralization in four separate
motions.39 The Panel considered centralization on “a company-bycompany basis”40 but determined that such a strategy would
potentially create “an unwieldy situation.”41 Instead, it denied three
of the four motions and transferred the cases in all four motions to
the District of Massachusetts for pretrial proceedings.42
In other instances, attorneys seeking centralization can succeed
in achieving centralization with a “second bite” at the apple. In the
Lipitor litigation, for example, the Panel initially denied a first
motion to transfer, which was filed by the plaintiffs in three cases in
the District of South Carolina.43 In addition to the three actions in
the movants’ district, the Panel’s order indicated that there were 23
additional related federal cases.44 The Panel’s August 2013 order
stated that “[a]ll responding plaintiffs support centralization,”45 but
that “[c]ommon defendant Pfizer Inc. strenuously opposes
centralization.”46 The Panel’s order explained the denial in the
following manner:
Upon a cursory review, one might think these cases
represent a clear candidate for centralization. The subject
actions do share factual issues arising from allegations that
taking Pfizer’s cholesterol drug can result in the
development of type 2 diabetes, and that Pfizer failed
adequately to warn consumers of this problem. The number
of actions pending in this litigation might, in other
circumstances, be sufficient to justify centralization.
However, other factors weigh against centralization here. In
38. See In re Immunex Corp. Average Wholesale Price Litig., 201 F. Supp.
2d 1378 (J.P.M.L. 2002).
39. The four motions were MDL No. 1453, In re Immunex Corp. Average
Wholesale Price Litigation; MDL No. 1454, In re Pharmacia Corp. Average
Wholesale Price Litigation; MDL No. 1455, In re Glaxosmithkline Corp.
Average Wholesale Price Litigation; and MDL No. 1456, In re Baxter
International, Inc. Average Wholesale Price Litigation. See id. at 1378. The last
of these motions was restyled as In re Pharmaceutical Industry Average
Wholesale Price Litigation. See id. at 1381−82.
40. Id. at 1380.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 1381.
43. In re Lipitor (Atorvastatin Calcium) Mktg., Sales Practices and Prods.
Liab. Litig., 959 F. Supp. 2d 1375, 1375 (J.P.M.L. 2013).
44. Id. at 1375 n.1.
45. Id. at 1375.
46. Id. at 1376.
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particular, almost half of the actions currently comprising
this litigation are pending in a single district—the District
of South Carolina, and many of the actions involve
common plaintiffs’ counsel. The South Carolina actions
already are proceeding in a coordinated fashion before one
judge, and, importantly, Pfizer represents in its brief that it
is “ready and willing to work with Plaintiffs’ counsel in the
[non-South Carolina] actions to appropriately coordinate
any common discovery or other pretrial matters across the
cases.” Given that express representation, the limited
number of involved actions, and the overlap among
counsel, we do not believe that creation of an MDL is
necessary at this time.47
The Panel concluded that, although the number of actions
involved in the litigation was large enough to justify centralization
in some circumstances, in the Lipitor litigation there was sufficient
“overlap among counsel”48 that centralization was not warranted. In
effect, common plaintiffs’ counsel and a “ready and willing”49
common defendant would be able to coordinate pretrial proceedings
outside of the formalities of an MDL proceeding.
In a second order filed in February 2014, however, the Panel
ordered centralization of the Lipitor litigation.50 The number of
related actions had increased from 26 to 56,51 with an additional 170
potential tag-alongs; actions were pending in 40 districts and before
more than 100 judges.52 The Panel also pointed to an apparent
decrease in the overlapping of counsel in the related actions: “the
number of involved plaintiffs’ firms has grown as well. In our
judgment, the increased presence of apparently unique counsel,
coupled with the increased number of involved actions, districts, and
judges, makes it highly difficult, if not impossible, to coordinate this
litigation effectively on an informal basis.”53
Another example of a successful “second bite” at the apple
regarding centralization is the Plavix litigation. In December 2011,
the Panel denied a motion to transfer filed by the defendant
pharmaceutical companies.54 The motion sought centralization of
47. Id. (footnote and citation omitted).
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. In re Lipitor (Atorvastatin Calcium) Mktg., Sales Practices and Prods.
Liab. Litig. (No. II), 997 F. Supp. 2d 1354, 1357 (J.P.M.L. 2014).
51. See id. at 1355–56.
52. See id.
53. Id.
54. In re Plavix Prods. Liab. Litig., 829 F. Supp. 2d 1378, 1378 (J.P.M.L.
2011). In this instance, the plaintiffs opposed centralization. Id.
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ten actions pending in the District of New Jersey and single actions
pending in the Eastern and Southern Districts of New York.55 In a
brief order, the Panel summarized its reasoning: “The limited
number of actions and relatively few involved counsel . . . weigh
against centralization. The District of New Jersey plaintiffs are all
represented by the same law firms, and plaintiffs in [the New York
districts] also share counsel.”56 In February 2013, however, the Panel
ordered transfer of some but not all pending actions to the District of
New Jersey, citing “a significant change in circumstances.”57 Among
the changing circumstances the Panel cited were an increase in the
number of related actions, such that actions were pending in a total of
14 districts;58 an increase in the volume of related state-court
actions, signaling a potential increase in federal cases;59 and that
“the number of law firms in the litigation also has increased
significantly . . . . In the present docket, there are not only more
involved actions but also significantly more involved counsel.”60
It is interesting to note that Pfizer, in its brief opposing
centralization the second time in the Lipitor litigation, argued in
part that centralization would “lead to the filing of a large number
of ‘non-viable’ cases (e.g., cases in which the subject plaintiffs
already had diabetes before they began taking Lipitor).”61 These
issues may be most acute for potential plaintiffs with claims based
on injuries that are not substance specific, like many kinds of
cancer or (as in Lipitor) diabetes.62 In other words, formal

55. Id. at 1379.
56. Id. at 1378 (footnote omitted).
57. In re Plavix Prods. Liab. Litig. (No. II), 923 F. Supp. 2d 1376, 1378
(J.P.M.L. 2013). Again, the plaintiffs opposed centralization. See id. at 1377.
The Panel denied, without prejudice, transfer of twelve actions in two districts in
which motions to remand to state court were pending. See id. at 1380.
58. See id.
59. See id. On this point, the existence of a large number of potential tagalongs was key: “The Miller Firm, which represents plaintiffs in a number of the
constituent actions in this docket, states that it represents plaintiffs in ‘hundreds’
of cases filed in California and Illinois, and defendants assert that the total
number of state cases exceeds 2,000. This dramatic increase . . . suggests that
the number of related federal actions will increase as well.” Id. at 1378.
60. Id. at 1379. Again, the presence of “unique law firm[s] (i.e., [firms] that
[appear] in no other related action)” indicates that informal coordination of
pretrial proceedings may not be adequate. Id. at 1379.
61. In re Lipitor (Atorvastatin Calcium) Mktg., Sales Practices and Prod.
Liab. Litig. (No. II), 997 F. Supp. 2d 1354, 1355–56 (J.P.M.L. 2014).
62. See, e.g., PETER H. SCHUCK, AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL: MASS TOXIC
DISASTERS IN THE COURTS 9 (1986) (“[T]he pathways of causation are difficult
to detect, the time periods extend over decades, and the effects are not readily
isolated or scientifically understood. In some cases the victims may not even
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aggregation of the Lipitor litigation would increase the claiming
rate in the overall litigation.63 There are clearly incentives for
attorneys in some circumstances to seek MDL centralization as a
strategy. In some instances, parties attempt to manufacture
multidistrict aggregation by filing a similar case in a second
district. As the Panel noted in one such instance: “It is only the
existence of the moving party’s newly-filed action in District Y
that gives the litigation its multidistrict character.”64 In another
instance, involving an airplane crash in Pakistan, the defendants
moved to consolidate two actions, one pending in the Central
District of California, the other in the Northern District of
Alabama.65 The Panel noted that “if plaintiff in the Northern
District of Alabama action had not filed his claims in both districts,
the multidistrict character of this litigation would not exist.”66
Remands to state court were also a more common outcome for
the non-centralized cases than for civil cases in general: 6%
compared to 3%, respectively. Non-centralized cases were also
more likely to terminate by “statistical closing” than civil cases in
general, 6% to 3%.67 This finding suggests that some noncentralized cases were placeholders filed to manufacture a multidistrict
know that they have been harmed or that their harm is associated with a
particular agent.”).
63. See, e.g., Deborah R. Hensler, Revisiting the Monster: New Myths and
Realities of Class Action and Other Large Scale Litigation, 11 DUKE. J. COMP.
& INT’L L. 179, 189 (2001). “Aggregation may also lead to higher claiming
rates, meaning that larger numbers of plaintiffs come forward to obtain
compensation.” Id. (footnote omitted). In some circumstances, either the quality
of the additional plaintiffs’ claims, or the value of their claims, would be too
small to be brought as individual actions. See id. at 198 (discussing cases in
which “losses were comparatively small, [so that] securing individual legal
representation on a contingency-fee basis would have been more problematic
unless plaintiff attorneys were prepared to pursue individual claims in a mass,
but non-class, litigation”).
64. In re Transocean Ltd. Sec. Litig. (No. II), 753 F. Supp. 2d 1373, 1375
(J.P.M.L. 2010). The Panel order described the facts in the Transocean motion
as “curious,” and noted that there were contentions from parties opposing
centralization that “the real reason [the movant] is now seeking centralization in
the Southern District of Texas is that under Second Circuit law, [the movant] is
not eligible for appointment as lead plaintiff.” Id. at 1374 n.2.
65. In re Air Crash Near Islamabad, Pakistan, on July 28, 2010, 777 F.
Supp. 2d 1352, 1353 (J.P.M.L. 2011).
66. Id.
67. Statistical closing is an administrative procedure used to close cases,
and thus to eliminate cases from a court’s statistical reports, when the docket is
inactive and no further proceedings are contemplated. See ADMIN. OFFICE OF
THE U.S. COURTS, CIVIL STATISTICAL REPORTING GUIDE 29 (Version 1.1, Mar.
2010).
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litigation out of a single action, as discussed in the preceding
paragraph. Interestingly, non-centralized cases were not more likely to
settle than civil cases in general. The “settlement” disposition accounts
for 22% of cases in both categories. The “voluntary dismissal”
category often includes settlements, as well. Combining these
categories yields a settlement rate of 36% for non-centralized cases
and 34% for civil cases in general.
A very low percentage of non-centralized cases go to trial (less
than 1%), but this is true of civil cases in general (1%). The dockets of
all the non-centralized trial cases were examined using PACER.
Although the “Trial” column in Figure 2 represents 19 case
dispositions, further research found only 12 actual trials, mostly
because of intra-district consolidation of non-centralized but related
cases. It is probably not wise to generalize about 12 cases, but as with
trial cases in general, these were unusual cases. In Eli Lilly & Co. v.
Actavis Elizabeth L.L.C.,68 for example, plaintiff pharmaceutical
manufacturer sued another pharmaceutical manufacturer for patent
infringement in the District of New Jersey. There was a related case in
the Eastern District of Virginia, providing for the multidistrict nature
and giving rise to the plaintiff’s motion to transfer69—but the Eastern
District case was dismissed, mooting the motion.70 After more than
five years of litigation—the docket runs to 760 entries, including
several additional defendants and an appeal to the Federal Circuit—
and a six-day bench trial, the court entered a final judgment in January
2013, awarding plaintiff with just $57,488.73 in costs.71 From the
perspective of costs, both parties probably would have been better off
settling, but it seems unlikely that the parties were interested in
settlement. But at least the plaintiffs in the Atomoxetine Patent
Litigation were awarded something. Perhaps the most unusual trial
case we examined was Mooney v. Allianz Life Ins. Co.,72 a class
action fraud action against a seller of deferred annuities. The Panel
denied transfer of overlapping class actions that had reached “a
significantly advanced stage,” with certified classes in “four actions,
and fact discovery . . . completed (or . . . nearing completion) in three

68. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Actavis Elizabeth L.L.C., 676 F. Supp. 2d 352 (D.N.J.
2011).
69. See Eli Lilly, No. 07-cv-3770 (DMC) (D.N.J filed Dec. 14, 2007).
70. Pleading No. 17 at 1, In re Atomoxetine Patent Litig., MDL No. 1924,
No. 2:07-45 (J.P.M.L. Mar. 18, 2008) (“The Panel has now been advised that the
listed Eastern District of Virginia action was dismissed.”).
71. Clerk’s Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Plaintiff’s Motion to
Tax Costs, Eli Lilly, 676 F. Supp. 2d 352 (D.N.J. Jan. 22, 2013).
72. Class Action Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, Mooney v. Allianz
Life Ins. Co., 244 F.R.D. 531 (D. Minn. Feb. 9, 2006) (No. 0:06-545).
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of them.”73 One of these certified class actions was tried before a jury
in the District of Minnesota. The jury found that the defendant had
engaged in fraud “but none of the Plaintiffs were harmed as a direct
result of the misrepresentation or deceptive practice. No damages were
awarded.”74 This is a rare find, indeed: a certified consumer class
action that went to trial, combined with a plaintiff’s verdict without
damages.
IV. TERMINATION OF CENTRALIZED CASES
The Panel Cases Database provides very limited information on
the nature of centralized case termination in MDL proceedings. The
most common code is “Closed,” appearing in 261,729 of the 339,480
cases with termination information (77%).75 This code does not
indicate the reason that the MDL cases were terminated in the
transferee district—i.e., whether the MDL cases were closed as the
result of a global settlement, some other form of settlement, a ruling on
a dispositive motion, a trial verdict, or simply based on a voluntary
dismissal without settlement. Moreover, because these cases have
different docket numbers in the transferor and transferee courts, the
matching technique that was used to identify the non-centralized cases
generally will not work with centralized cases.
TABLE 1: TERMINATION CODES FOR MDL CASES, 1992–AUGUST
2013 (SOURCE: PANEL CASES DATABASE) (N=339,480)
Termination
Code
Closed
CRO/Remand
Final
State Court
Admin. Closed
N

Asbestos
[MDL 875]
71%
1%

All Other
Products Liability
85%
6%

Non-Products
Liability
70%
3%

2%
25%
163,267

7%
0%
150,793

5%
3%
25,420

Table 1 summarizes the disposition codes for terminated MDL
cases, breaking out the asbestos cases, all other products liability
cases, and all non-products liability proceedings as separate
columns. As Table 1 makes very clear, 71% of asbestos cases that
73. In re Allianz Life Ins. Co. of N. Am. Deferred Annuity Mktg. & Sales
Practices Litig., 517 F. Supp. 2d 1364, 1365 (2007).
74. Jury Verdict, In re Allianz, 244 F.R.D. 531 (D. Minn. Oct. 16, 2009).
75. 80% of the cases in the database had terminated as of August 2013.
There were 87,360 pending MDL cases as of that date.
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have terminated in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania were coded
as “Closed” in the database, and another 25% were coded as
“Administratively Closed.”76 Together, these two codes account
for 96% of all asbestos terminations. One percent of asbestos
cases—a total of 760 cases over the course of the proceeding—
were remanded to transferor courts, and 2% were remanded to
state court.77
The pattern for non-asbestos products liability cases is
different. “Closed” is still the most common code—occurring in
85% of the terminated MDL cases—but very few of these cases
were administratively closed (rounds to zero). However, a much
larger proportion of non-asbestos products liability cases were
remanded to the transferor court—6% of all MDL terminations—
and a much larger proportion were remanded to state court—7%. It
would be overly hasty to conclude, however, that remands to
transferor courts are widely distributed among non-asbestos MDL
proceedings. Remands to the transferor court were concentrated in
just five MDL proceedings: 59% of remands were in MDL No.
926 (In re Silicone Gel Breast Implants Products Liability
Litigation); 14% were in MDL No. 1014 (In re Orthopedic Bone
Screw Products Liability Litigation); 6% in MDL No. 1148 (In re
Latex Gloves Products Liability Litigation); 6% in MDL No. 1407
(In re Phenylpropanolamine (PPA) Products Liability Litigation);
and 4% in MDL No. 1507 (In re Prempro Products Liability).
These five MDL proceedings account for 89% of all section 1407
remands in non-asbestos products liability proceedings. Outside of
these proceedings, remand to the transferor court for further
proceedings has been a very uncommon occurrence. The same is
true for remands to state court; 76% of all remands to state court in
non-asbestos products liability cases were in just two proceedings:
50% in MDL No. 1535 (In re Welding Fume Products Liability
Litigation), and 26% in MDL No. 926 (In re Silicone Gel Breast
Implants Products Liability Litigation).

76. Moreover, 98% of the asbestos cases in the database had terminated as
of the last update. Few cases now remain in this MDL proceeding. This is a
remarkable development, given the history of this litigation. See generally
Eduardo C. Robreno, The Federal Asbestos Product Liability Multidistrict
Litigation (MDL-875): Black Hole or New Paradigm? 23 WIDENER L.J. 97
(2013) (documenting history and new developments in the asbestos multidistrict
proceeding, authored by current transferee judge).
77. Transferee judges have the power to rule on section 1447 remand
motions in transferred cases. See, e.g., J.P.M.L & FED. JUD. CTR., TEN STEPS TO
BETTER CASE MANAGEMENT: A GUIDE FOR MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION
TRANSFEREE JUDGES 5 (2009).
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In the non-products liability cases, closure in the transferee
court is still the most common termination code, at 70%. Three
percent of non-products liability cases are remanded to the
transferor court, and 5% are remanded to state court.78
In short, in most MDL proceedings, few, if any, cases
terminate other than by closure in the transferee court. Further
research is needed to identify exactly how these cases terminate in
the transferee court—by global settlement or other means.
V. SECTION 1407 REMANDS, 2000–2013
As discussed in the preceding section, section 1407 remands to
the transferor court are relatively uncommon; most centralized
cases are resolved in the transferee court, with or without a global
settlement.79 This section analyzes the 2,361 section 1407 remand
cases that were identified in the 2000–2013 database, a subset of
the cases in the prior section on which more complete information
was found. These cases were found in 127 MDL proceedings—i.e.,
in most proceedings, there are no remands to the transferor court.
Even in the MDL proceedings with section 1407 remands, remands
were not terribly common. The modal number of remands in these
127 proceedings is one (52 of the proceedings had a single
remand). Table 2 lists the MDL proceedings with the most section
1407 remand cases. The most section 1407 remands in this period,
20%, were in MDL No. 1407 (In re Phenylpropanolamine (PPA)
Products Liability Litigation). Not surprisingly, 17% of all the
remands in the database were in MDL No. 875 (In re Asbestos
Products Liability Litigation (VI)). Given that this is the largest
MDL proceeding of all time, this makes a great deal of sense. The
asbestos MDL proceeding is followed by several other large
products liability MDL proceedings: MDL No. 1507 (In re
Prempro Products Liability Litigation), 15% of remands; MDL No.
1148 (In re Latex Gloves Products Liability Litigation), 9%; MDL
1203 (In re Diet Drugs (Phentermine/Fenfluramine/Dexfenfluramine)
Products Liability Litigation), 5%; MDL No. 1760 (In re Aredia and
78. In the non-products liability cases, moreover, the remands are more
widely distributed among proceedings. No single non-products liability
proceeding accounts for more than 15 % of remands to state court, and no single
proceeding accounts for more than 21 % of remands to the transferor courts.
79. See also Gregory Hansel, Extreme Litigation: An Interview with Judge
Wm. Terrell Hodges, Chairman of the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation,
19 ME. B.J. 16, 21 (2004) (“At that point, the litigation, like all cases for that
matter, tends to settle or is resolved by summary judgment rulings by the transferee
judge, so remand for trial is unnecessary. The cases go away through settlement or
some other thing. It is only occasionally that cases are remanded . . . .”).
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Zometa Products Liability Litigation), 5%; MDL No. 1373 (In re
Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. Tires Products Liability Litigation), 4%;
and MDL No. 2016 (In re Yamaha Motor Corp. Rhino ATV Products
Liability Litigation), 2%. These eight large proceedings account for
75% of all section 1407 remands during this period.80 Section 1407
remand cases were also identified in 119 additional proceedings,
accounting for another quarter of remands. Eighty-nine percent of the
section 1407 remand cases are products liability cases, which is
consistent with the percentage of all centralized cases that are
products liability.

80. It is interesting to note that several of the proceedings with the highest
numbers of section 1407 remands were also proceedings in which there was a de
facto global settlement rather than a court-approved global settlement.
Presumably, the critical issues in these proceedings were decided in the
transferee court, with the plaintiff attorneys and defendants agreeing on a
framework to begin settling cases, either individually or in groups. Some of
these settlements would have occurred before remand to the transferor court, but
others may have occurred after. In PPA, there was evidence that settlement was
piecemeal, yet added up to be more or less global, with remanded cases adding
their pieces. There was no global settlement, although there was a class
settlement relating to Dexatrim, one of the products containing PPA. See In re
Phenylpropanolamine (PPA) Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 2:01-md-01407 (W.D.
Wash. May 10, 2013) (Chattem, Inc.’s, Motion to Enforce Settlement/Judgment
and to Enjoin). Yet the court noted “the considerable success achieved for
plaintiffs in this litigation,” including “settlements exceed[ing] $307,500,000,”
in awarding $15.5 million in fees to attorneys who performed work that
benefitted all plaintiffs. See In re Phenylpropanolamine (PPA) Prods. Liab.
Litig., No. 2:01-md-01407 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 18, 2009) (order granting
common benefit fee committee’s petition and directing payment of fees earned
by attorneys performing common benefit work). The court determined that the
PPA litigation, centralized in 2001, had matured by the end of 2003 and set forth
a procedure for any party’s attorney to petition for a suggestion of remand order.
See In re Phenylpropanolamine (PPA) Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 2:01-md-01407
(W.D. Wash. Nov. 18, 2003) (case management order no. 17 remand of cases).
Because other parties could object to remand, the procedure seems designed to
expedite remand of cases when the parties were in agreement, and thus perhaps
in the process of settling.
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TABLE 2: MDL PROCEEDINGS WITH MOST SECTION 1407
REMANDS, 2000–2013
Proceeding
MDL No. 1407
MDL No. 875
MDL No. 1507
MDL No. 1148
MDL No. 1203
MDL No. 1760
MDL No. 1373
MDL No. 2016
119 additional
proceedings

Number of section
1407 Remands
479
399
356
204
111
107
86
39

Percentage of section
1407 Remands
20%
17%
15%
9%
5%
5%
4%
2%

580

25%

Studying the ultimate disposition of the section 1407 remand
cases proved to be quite challenging. The textbook section 1407
remand case should have at least two records in the transferor
court.81 First, the case will close in the transferor court when
transferred to the transferee court. Second, after remand it will
reopen, thus creating a new record, and then close in the transferor
court again at some point.82 It is not uncommon, however, for cases
to have more than two records in the transferor court in the courts’
civil Integrated Data Base (IDB), signaling that, for some reason, the
district court closed the case and then re-opened it at least one
additional time—either before or after the section 1407 transfer and
remand sequence. To address this issue, the disposition code for the
last record for a case not coded “statistical close” was treated as
definitive. In the event that the only post-remand record was coded
“statistical close,” that code was assigned.
Two other sets of cases proved to be even more problematic.
Some section 1407 remand cases from the Cases Database do not
match to the IDB at all—a general issue discussed briefly in the
Technical Appendix. Another set of section 1407 remand cases only
had a single record in the IDB; i.e., they deviate from the textbook
model described in the preceding section. In some of these cases, the
81. In the IDB, a new case record is typically generated whenever a case is
reopened. For example, a case that is closed with the granting of summary
judgment in the district court and then re-opened with an appellate remand
reversing that judgment would appear in the IDB two times.
82. Because cases are typically assigned a new docket number in the
transferee court, it is not feasible to match case records in the transferor and
transferee courts.
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single record represented the pre- and post-centralization case in one
record. It appears that, in a small subset of MDL cases, the
transferor court does not actually close the record at the time of the
section 1407 transfer; if these cases are subsequently remanded,
there is no second record, but the new disposition information is
assigned when the remanded case closes in the transferor court
(technically, for a second time). In a second subset of the singlerecord cases, the remanded case appears to have been assigned a
new docket number in the transferor court and thus cannot be
matched to the corresponding pre-transfer case record. This need not
be “error” on the part of the transferor court. Some of these remand
cases are, technically, “new” cases, created in the transferee court
through the transferee severed procedure described above.83 In
Figure 4, all cases were included, including single-record cases, with
non-transfer dispositions, that match to the IDB.
As can be seen in Figure 4, the most common disposition for a
section 1407 remand case back in the transferor court is settlement,
which accounts for half of all records (50%). Other dismissal (18%)
and voluntary dismissal (15%) account for another third of the
records. Because many, and probably most, of these dispositions are
also the result of a settlement, it is likely safe to conclude that more
than eight in ten section 1407 remand cases terminate with a
settlement in the transferor court. This is an interesting finding—
settlement in the transferee court is hardly an unusual occurrence,
after all. But for some reason, these cases were settled only after
remand. It is likely that, in some of these cases, the settlement after
remand is an individual settlement removed from a more
comprehensive settlement, if any, in the transferee court. It is also
likely that, in some of these cases, the settlement reached in the
transferor court was related to a more comprehensive settlement in
the transferee court.

83. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
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Percentage of dispositions

FIGURE 4: DISPOSITIONS FOR REMAND CASES (N=1,608),
2000–2013
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It is also interesting that 5% of section 1407 remand cases were
resolved on a pretrial motion in the transferor court, most likely on
summary judgment. As in the trial cases, section 1407 remand does
not necessarily mean that all issues related to an individual plaintiff’s
claims have been resolved in the transferee court. It only means that
the issues common to the centralized MDL cases have been
resolved.84 In a relatively small percentage of section 1407 remand
cases, then, defendants prevail on a motion for summary judgment
relating to an individual plaintiff’s claims. Many, if not most, of the
summary judgment cases probably turn on issues of individual
causation. In a products liability action, for example, an order in the
MDL proceeding establishing general causation does not relieve
individual plaintiffs of making a showing of specific causation after a
section 1407 remand.85 Individual causation appears to be a common
84. See supra notes 16–18 and accompanying text.
85. See, e.g., Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Plaintiff’s Motion
to Modify/Discharge/Declare not Applicable Protective Order Issued in MDL
Action, Nelson v. Matrixx Initiatives, Inc., No. 3:09-2904, 2012 WL 1380259
(N.D. Cal. Oct. 10, 2012) (granting summary judgment to defendants because
plaintiff was unable to provide admissible expert testimony on specific
causation); c.f. Order, Meade v. Ford Motor Co., No. 1:09-1833, 2011 WL
4402539 (N.D. Ga. Sept. 20, 2011) (granting summary judgment because
plaintiff’s expert witnesses’ testimony was insufficient to establish a design
defect, despite recall). Summary judgment on the basis of missing expert
evidence is not limited to the products liability cases, however. See, e.g.,
Memorandum and Order, Sciallo et al. v. Tyco Int’l Ltd., No. 1:03-7770, 2012
WL 2861340 (S.D.N.Y. July 9, 2012) (granting summary judgment in a
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issue in asbestos section 1407 remand cases, given the difficulty that
many plaintiffs have providing evidence that the plaintiff’s injuries
were proximately caused by any particular defendant’s asbestoscontaining products.86 But summary judgment can be granted on other
grounds, as well. In a few cases, summary judgment was granted to
defendants on statute-of-limitations grounds in the transferor court—
even if the cases had been part of an MDL proceeding for several
years.87
Relatedly, the surprisingly low trial rate for the section 1407
remand cases—only 2%, representing 27 jury verdicts, two bench
trials, and one directed verdict—must be considered in light of the
distinction between individual and common issues in a centralized
MDL proceeding. The MDL transferee court will suggest remand
when it has completed common pretrial proceedings, but that does not
necessarily mean that the constituent cases are “ready for trial.” There
may in fact be a great deal of individual discovery remaining in a
section 1407 remand case. Moreover, the settlement rate must be
considered in relation to the trial rate. To the extent that the parties face
further discovery costs in the section 1407 remand cases, this may
provide an incentive to settle back in the transferor court. To the extent
that there is a “firm” trial date, the parties may also have powerful
incentives to settle.
The trial rate for section 1407 remand cases is similar to the trial
rate for civil cases in general. On this point, there is a bit of historical
irony. When the Judicial Conference proposed the creation of the
multidistrict litigation procedure in the 1960s, some critics of the
proposal argued that it could create injustice to have one judge manage
the pretrial proceedings and a different judge, much less familiar with
the issues than the transferee judge, preside at trial in the same case.88

securities fraud action because plaintiffs had failed to timely file expert evidence
to support loss causation).
86. Wannall v. Honeywell Int’l, Inc., 292 F.R.D. 26 (D.D.C. 2013) (plaintiff
was unable to show that exposure to defendant’s asbestos-containing products
was sufficient cause of decedent’s mesothelioma, given multiple exposures).
87. See, e.g., Bryant v. Wyeth, Inc., 816 F. Supp. 2d 329 (S.D. Miss. 2011)
(granting summary judgment in a products liability action on statute-oflimitations ground, after case had been in transferee court several years);
Memorandum, Opinion, and Order, Linton v. Wyeth Inc., No. 1:04-705, 2012
WL 5303850 (S.D. Miss. Oct. 25, 2012); see also Order, Dvorak v. Prudential
Ins. Co., No. 0:97-cv-7018 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 26, 2001) (granting summary
judgment in a sales practices action based on Florida’s statute of limitations for
fraud claims).
88. See, e.g., A Proposal to Provide Pretrial Consolidation of Multidistrict
Litigation: Hearing on H.R. 8276 Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in
Judicial Machinery, 89th Cong. 89 (1966) (letter from Hon. Emanuel Celler)
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This does not appear to have been an actual problem in the
overwhelming majority of section 1407 remand cases, which
themselves represent only a very small percentage of all centralized
MDL cases.89
The 30 trials—and again, mostly jury verdicts—represented in
Figure 3 took place in nine proceedings. So out of the 127 proceedings
with section 1407 remand cases, a trial disposition could not be located
in 118, or 93%. In other words, most MDL proceedings do not
produce section 1407 remands, and even the MDL proceedings that
produce them do not appear to result in individual trials. The MDL
proceedings in which the trial dispositions were located are listed in
Table 3. There were seven trials on remand in MDL No. 1507 (In re
Prempro Products Liability Litigation) and MDL No. 1760 (In re
Aredia and Zometa Products Liability Litigation), and six in MDL No.
1373 (In re Bridgestone/Firestone Tires Products Liability Litigation).
We also identified three trials each in MDL No. 875 (In re Asbestos
Products Liability Litigation) and MDL No. 1203 (In re Diet Drugs
(Phentermine/Fenfluramine/Dexfenfluramine Products Liability
Litigation). These are all large MDL proceedings, accounting for large
numbers of remands during our study period, so it makes sense that
most of the trial dispositions occurred in these cases.
TABLE 3: TRIALS IN SECTION 1407 REMAND CASES, 2000–2013
Proceeding
MDL No. 1507
MDL No. 1760
MDL No. 1373
MDL No. 875
MDL No. 1203
MDL No. 1061
MDL No. 1132
MDL No. 1148
MDL No. 1721
Total

Number of trials
7
7
6
3
3
1
1
1
1
30

(“It follows that if a case is pretried in a distant forum by other parties in other
cases under the procedures followed by a different court injustice may well
result.”).
89. Remand to the transferor district does not necessarily mean that a
different judge will try the case, even in the event of a trial. The transferee judge
may seek an interdistrict assignment for purposes of trying a remanded case in
the transferor district. See ROTHSTEIN & BORDEN, supra note 14, at 5.
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During the Symposium discussion in March, Professor
McGovern suggested that some asbestos trials were likely missing.
Given the difficulties matching some of the section 1407 remand
records to the IDB, we have no doubt that this is probably true.
Further analysis of the IDB indicates 21 asbestos products liability
cases terminating by trial in districts other than the Eastern District
of Pennsylvania since 2000; some of these cases are likely section
1407 remand cases that we cannot match to the Cases Database.
CONCLUSION
When the organizers of this Symposium asked us if we were
interested in writing something on the subject of “Disaggregation”
in the context of multidistrict litigation, it did not take us long to
focus on these two categories of cases—those cases that are part of
a transfer motion that is not granted, and those cases that are
transferred but then subsequently remanded to the transferor court.
In a very real sense, these cases are at the margins of the MDL
process. Most cases are centralized, especially if one factors in the
large numbers of tag-along cases in some products liability
proceedings. And few centralized cases are remanded to the
transferor court, and even post-remand, the most likely outcome
for an MDL case is settlement.
This raises the question: What role does remand play in
contemporary multidistrict litigation? Perhaps the potential for
remand is best understood as a tool to assist the transferee judge in
focusing the parties on global resolution. Plaintiffs may disfavor
disaggregation because they will lose the concentrated pressure on
defendants of hundreds or thousands of cases.90 On the other hand,
defendants may fear remand because it creates the potential for
multiple trials, each one a gamble that may result in a huge
judgment.91
The Panel has in recent years made clear that remand is not a
failed outcome in MDL proceedings. Once efficiencies in pretrial
proceedings have been exploited, it is appropriate to return the
cases to their transferor districts. By statute, one of the goals of the
MDL process is to create efficiencies in the judicial system. By
having one judge working through several similar cases in a single
proceeding, instead of multiple judges working on individual cases
across the country, judicial time and resources are saved. The
Panel frequently cites efficiency as a reason for centralizing cases
90. See Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Disaggregating, 90 WASH. U.L. REV.
667, 693–94 (2013) [hereinafter Burch, Disaggregating].
91. See id.
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in a proceeding.92 Commentators have expressed concern about
remand because transferor judges may lack the expertise in the
subject matter of the litigation that transferee judges have
accumulated during the proceedings.93 Nonetheless, we find these
cases to be similar to all other civil litigation in how they
terminate: relatively few go to trial. Given a goal of efficiency, it is
hardly surprising that centralization is so often the Panel’s
decision, and that substantially many more cases are centralized
than denied.94 Although centralization is frequent, it is hardly a
definite outcome, and attorneys who attempt to manufacture
litigation in multiple districts see the Panel call out their actions
and deny centralization.95 Of course, if it is later determined that
there are legitimate reasons for centralization, the Panel is willing
to revisit its decision as seen in the Plavix and Lipitor litigations.96
Moreover, if efficiency is a goal—and it seems fair to say that it
is—the rarity of remanding cases should not be surprising either.
Remand is a tool transferee judges can use to manage litigation,
but it is rarely necessary, even in the most complex of MDLs such
as Asbestos and PPA. In a world of aggregate litigation, there is
relatively little disaggregation once constituent cases are combined
through centralization.
TECHNICAL APPENDIX
To examine the nature of disaggregate litigation, we relied on
two databases. The first database, called the Panel Cases Database,
was compiled from data provided by the Panel in August of 2013.
The data reports the case number, district of filing, potential MDL
proceeding number and type of proceeding, as well as the Panel’s
decision regarding centralization, the date of the decision, and the
action taken by the Panel with respect to the case (e.g., CTO,
92. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2012); Margaret S. Williams and Tracey E.
George, Who Will Manage Complex Civil Litigation? The Decision to Transfer
and Consolidate Multidistrict Litigation, 10 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 424
(2013); Burch, Unsettling Efficiency, supra note 3, at 195–96.
93. Burch, Diasggregating, supra note 90, at 696.
94. Emery G. Lee III, Catherine Borden, Margaret S. Williams, and Kevin
M. Scott, Multidistrict Centralization: An Empirical Examination, (Fed. Judicial
Ctr., working paper) (on file with authors).
95. See, e.g., In re Transocean Ltd. Sec. Litig. (No. II), 753 F. Supp. 2d
1373, 1375 (J.P.M.L. 2010); In re Air Crash Near Islamabad, Pakistan, on July
28, 2010, 777 F. Supp. 2d 1352, 1353 (J.P.M.L. 2011).
96. In re Plavix Prods. Liab. Litig. (No. II), 923 F. Supp. 2d 1376, 1378
(J.P.M.L. 2013); In re Lipitor (Atorvastatin Calcium) Mktg., Sales Practices &
Prods. Liab. Litig. (No. II), MDL No. 2502, 2014 WL 661589 (J.P.M.L. Feb. 18,
2014).
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NTN). The Panel’s data include a wide array of cases, but are only
complete since about 1992 when the Panel began to automate its
records.
The data from the Panel were merged with the IDB maintained
by the Federal Judicial Center and available from ICPSR. This data
includes case information including filing and termination dates
and districts, nature of suit code, case disposition, as well as other
information such as trial date (if any). The most recent version of
the civil IDB contains records for all cases filed (or terminated)
since 2000. For this reason, our analysis of matched cases is
generally limited to the period from 2000 to 2013; our analysis of
the Cases Database generally extends to 1992.
The data from the IDB were matched to the Panel’s data using
an SQL merge to join the two databases, matching on district and
case number. The merge allowed us to include all the Panel
cases—those that did match to a case in the IDB as well as those
that did not. There were 338,737 cases in the merged dataset,
12,397 of which did not match to the IDB. Many of the unmatched
cases were in older MDL proceedings, leading us to believe that
the Panel’s case number was not the original case number, making
it impossible to match. With the data merged, we then removed
any duplicate cases from the database. Although the duplicate
cases had the same case number, they often had different filing
dates. Generally speaking, we wanted the last record in the
sequence of filing dates, assuming the last record did not have a
disposition code of statistical close (a disposition code frequently
used for record keeping purposes, after all substantive matters in
the case are resolved). There were a few cases where every
disposition code in the sequence of cases was statistical close, and
so we simply took the last case in the sequence, consistent with our
other coding decisions. After removing all duplicate cases, we
were left with 315,516 cases, 96% of which had a match with a
case in the IDB. It is on these cases that we conducted our analysis.

